中觀四百論-第十六 教誡弟子品

 第十六 教誡弟子品
1. 由少因緣故，疑空謂不空，依前諸品中，理教應重遣。
[索]由於實執等少許因緣故，懷疑自性本空諸法為不空，應依前述十五品中所述的理教，並著重加以遣除。

2. 能所說若有，空理則為無，諸法假緣成，故三事非有。
[索]若汝宗有能說、所說、說者存在，則一切法自性空的義理不能成立；諸法唯是藉因緣安立，故能說、所說、說者三事非有自性。

3. 若唯說空過，不空義即成，不空過已明，空義應先立。
[索]如果只由說空性的過失，不空的義理即可成立，那麼不空的過失早已說明了，空性的義理應該先成立。

4. 諸欲壞他宗，必應成己義，何樂談他失，而無立己宗。
[索]凡是要破壞他宗所說空義者，必須先應成立自宗的實有宗義；汝等為何只樂於談論他宗的過失，而無有成立自宗的義理呢？

5. 為破一等執，假立遣為宗，他三執既除，自宗隨不立。
[索]如果說一切法經觀察就無有自性，彼義不能成立為宗，那麼汝等所許的一性、異性、非一非異性等三種，也都不能成立為宗義。
(若觀察即無，彼不成為宗，則一性等三，亦皆非宗義。)

問曰：世人皆可現見瓶等實有不虛，因此實有宗能成立，而許瓶等空無自性，與現量相違故，既無意義也無作用。
6. 許執為現見，空因非有能，餘宗現見因，此宗非所許。
[索]許瓶為現量所見境，故而認為空性的能立因沒有能力作用；餘宗所許的現見等實有因，在空性推理中不能成立，而我們所許的諸法空性因（推理根據），在其餘宗派中也是承許的。
(許瓶為現見，空因非有能，餘宗所說因，此無餘容有。)

問曰：汝等中觀宗許一切皆為空性，應當許有空性的實體，但空性是觀待不空而立，因此諸法應是實有不空。
7. 若無不空理，空理如何成，汝既不立空，不空應不立。
[索]既然無有不空的法，那麼空性又從何而起，就像無有所對治之物，能對治者又怎麼能成立呢？
(既無有不空，空復從何起，如無所治品，能治云何成。)

問曰：如果你們中觀宗許一切皆無自性，如是應一切完全無有，汝空性宗也不能成立為宗。如果你們承認有自宗，那與空性宗相觀待的實有宗也應成立。
8. 若許有無宗，有宗方可立，無宗若非有，有宗應不成。
[索]如果中觀宗承認自宗實有成立，那麼無自性宗即應成為有宗；而無自性宗如果非實有，那麼有宗理應不能成立。
(若許有宗者，無宗即成宗，無宗若非有，有宗應不成。)

問曰：諸有為法是實有，因為火等差別法實有存在故。
9. 若諸法皆空，如何火名煖，此如前具遣，火煖俗非真。
[索]如果諸法皆空無自體，那麼為什麼火名為暖熱呢？暖熱的火亦非有自性，如前述內容中已俱遮遣。
(若諸法皆空，如何火名煖，煖火亦非有，如前已俱遣。)

10. 若謂法實有，遮彼說為空，應四論皆真，見何過而捨。
[索]如果說諸法實有本體，為了遮止彼等才說為空性；有無等四邊若皆為真實，則任何人也不能見到彼等有應被捨棄的過失。 

11. 若諸法都無，生死應非有，諸佛何曾許，執法定為無。
[索]諸法之中乃至最細的極微本體都不存在，因而怎麼能生起諸實有體性之法呢？一切智智佛陀也未許本無自性之法實有，因此彼等許諸法有自性之宗皆不應理。
(乃至極微體，都無如何生，佛亦未許無，故彼不應理。)

12. 若真離有無，何緣言俗有，汝本宗亦爾，致難復何為。
[索]如果諸法的真實相遠離有無等一切邊戲，那麼汝等以何因緣說世俗諸法實有呢？所以汝等本宗也應如是承認，而致我們責難又做什麼呢？

13. 諸法若都無，差別應非有，執諸法皆有，差別亦應無。
[索]諸法本無實有體性，不應存在有實無實的差別；諸物上共見諦實空的空性，彼性即是無有任何差別之平等空相。
(諸法無體性，不應有差別，諸物上共見，彼即無差別。)

14. 若謂法非有，無能破有因，破有因已明，汝宗何不立。
[索]如果說以中觀師許一切法皆無有故，自宗不能答難，那麼他宗以因明推理方式破你們自宗，你等為什麼不能成立自宗呢？
(無故於他宗，不能答難者，他因破自宗，何故不自立。)

問曰：雖然我們不能成立自宗，但是要破斥他宗非常容易，世人也經常說：“雖然自己難以做到，但是看別人的過失非常容易。”
15. 說破因易得，是世俗虛言，汝何緣不能，遮破真空義。
[索]說破斥他宗的因容易得到，只是世俗的虛妄之言；否則你等有事宗，為何不能以理遮破真空義呢？

16. 有名詮法有，謂法實非無，無名表法無，法實應非有。
[索]若以有名稱詮釋的法是實有，便說諸法實有而非無自性；那麼以無諦實的名言表達諸法無自性，諸法實體應非有。

17. 由名解法有，遂謂法非無，因名知法無，應信法非有。
[索]若由名稱解說諸法實有，便說諸法非無自性，那麼因名稱而了知諸法無實，也應信解諸法非有實體。

18. 諸世間可說，皆是假非真，離世俗名言，乃是真非假。
[索]如果是世間人所說的諸法實有，那麼都只是世俗名言中的有；而諸法有自性（是勝義中有），怎麼能成為世間有呢？
(若由世間說，皆世間有者，諸法有自性，何成世間有。)

19. 謗諸法為無，可墮於無見，唯蠲諸妄執，如何說墮無。
[索]若諸法本來實在講諸法為無，可以說此是墮於諸法畢竟無有的斷見，但中觀宗只是為除去諸虛妄迷執，怎麼能說是墮於斷滅無邊呢？

20. 有非真有故，無亦非真無，既無有真無，何有於真有。
[索]由於諸法的有性無有故，無性也非實有，有性既然非有存在，那麼觀待而立的無性依何者成立呢？
(由無有性故，無性亦非有，有性既非有，無性依何立。)

問曰：汝等要成立空性，必定要有能立的因，由有因故，所以諸法空性不是空性，成實有。
21. 有因證法空，法空應不立，宗因無異故，因體實為無。
[索]由有證成諸法空性的因，諸法空性不應成立；宗與因二者非是異體故，因的體性實為無有。

22. 謂空喻別有，例諸法非空，唯有喻應成，內我同烏黑。
[索]若說自性空的同喻可以單獨另處存有，由此而例證諸法非為空性，則僅有比喻即應成立，如是內我應同烏鴉一樣是黑色。

問曰：假若因喻皆非實有，則一切法亦應畢竟不能成立，因此汝造論破他實有宗也成唐捐，沒有任何必要。
23. 若法本性空，見空有何德，虛妄分別縛，證空見能除。
[索]如果諸法本來是自性有，那麼現見空性有什麼功德呢？有情為虛妄的實執分別所縛，唯以證空性見方能除滅。
(若法本性有，見空有何德，虛妄分別縛，證空見能除。)

24. 法成一成無，違真亦違俗，故與有一異，二俱不可言。
[索]說一法有而一法無者，非是真諦也非為世俗，因此不能宣說，此是實有彼是非有。
(說一有一無，非真亦非俗，是故不能說，此有彼非有。)

問曰：汝等中觀師善於以理破除實有宗，而我等實有師不能破汝等空性宗，現在我等雖然無法答复，但是仍然有不少人在精進修習各種教法，總有一天有人也會破除汝等觀點，指出空性宗的過失。
25. 有非有俱非，諸宗皆寂滅，於中欲興難，畢竟不能申。
[索]有、非有、亦有亦非有、非有非非有，諸有邊執之宗皆於中觀宗前寂滅，所以於中觀宗欲興問難，畢竟不能申辯成功。

聖天菩薩。造論既周。重敘摧邪。復說頌曰：
我在為燎邪宗火，沷以如來正教酥，又扇因明廣大風，誰敢如蛾投猛焰。

CHAPTER 16
376. For various reasons, that which is empty
Appears nonetheless as if not empty.
These are refuted individually
By all the chapters.
377. When the author and subject also exist
It is incorrect to call them empty.
Also with regard to these three, whatever
Arises in dependence does not exist.
378. If through flaws concerning emptiness
[Things] were established as not empty,
Why would emptiness not be established
Through flaws concerning lack of emptiness?
379. In refuting the thesis of others
And in proving your own thesis,
If on the one hand you like to disprove,
Why do you not like to prove?
380. When thoroughly investigated,
The non-existent is not a thesis.
Then all three, such as oneness,
Are also not theses.
381. Where a pot is directly perceptible,
The argument of emptiness is meaningless.
Here reasons appearing in textual systems
Are not [acceptable]; elsewhere they are.
382. When there is nothing that is not empty,
How can emptiness be so?
When the one does not exist,
Why should the antidote exist?
383. If there were a thesis, absence of the thesis
Would in entity be a thesis,
But where there is no thesis
What can be the counter-thesis?
384. How can fire be hot,
When things do not exist?
This was refuted above: it was said
That even hot fire does not exist.

385. If through seeing things one could refute
The statement that things do not exist,
Who then sees the elimination
Of fallacies regarding all four theses.
386. When there is nowhere, even in particles,
A truly existent entity, how can it occur?
Even for Buddhas it does not exist.
Thus it is irrelevant.
387. If they are not twofold, how can
Anything have an existent entity?
If that is reasonable to you also,
Why raise further arguments?
388. Regarding the non-functional [aspect] of all things,
Differentiations are inappropriate.
That which is seen in all substantial entities
Is not differentiable.
389. If owing to non-existence you claim
No reply is made the other's thesis,
Why should you not also prove
Your own thesis which is refuted by reasons?
390. Though the world says it is easy
To find reasons with which to refute,
Why can the errors regarding
The others' thesis not be stated?
391. If just by saying “They exist”
Things really did exist,
Why should they not also be non-existent
Just by saying “They do not exist”?
392. If a thing is not non-existent
Because the term “existent” is ascribed,
Neither is it existent
Because the term “existent” is applied.
393. If everything is a convention
Because expressed by ordinary people,
How can anything which exists
As [its own] suchness be a convention?

394. If things are non-existent because
Things all do not exist,
In that case it is incorrect that all theses
Concern the non-existence of things.
395. Since a thing does not exist
A non-thing cannot exist.
Without a thing's existence,
How can a non-thing be established?
396. If things are not empty because
They are empty by virtue of reasons,
The thesis would not be distinct from the reasons,
And thus the reasons would not exist.
397. If things are not empty because
There are analogies for emptiness,
Can one say,”Just like the crow,
So too the self is black”?
398. If things exist inherently
What good is it to perceive emptiness?
Perception by way of conceptions binds.
This is refuted here.
399. To say one exists and the other does not
Is neither reality nor the conventional.
Therefore it cannot be said
That this exists and that does not.
400. Against one who holds no thesis that [things]
Exist, do not, or do and do not exist,
Counter-arguments cannot be raised
No matter how long [one tries].

中觀四百論-第十五 破有為相品

 第十五 破有為相品
問曰：有為法是有自性，因為彼等有生住滅的能相。
1. 若本無而生，先無何不起，本有而生者，後有復應生。
[索]若因於最後剎那​​壞滅時，可生起無有的果法，而果法於因中既然無有，又怎麼能有自性的生？若因中有果，則果本來就已生起，因此已有的法豈能再生？
(最後無而生，既無何能生；有則本來生，故有豈能生。)

2. 果若能違因，先無不應理，果立因無用，先有亦不成。
[索]果若能違害因法，那麼於因位時先無有果則不應理；果法若先已成立，則因成無用，所以於因位先有果法存在的觀點亦不能成立。

3. 此時非有生，彼時亦無生，此彼時無生，何時當有生。
[索]果法已有之此時非有生，果法無有之彼時也無有生，此時彼時都無有生，那麼何時會有生呢？

問曰：從牛奶變成優格時就是生，所以生是實有。
4. 如生於自性，生義既為無，於他性亦然，生義何成有。
[索]猶如生於自體性之法，其生義既為無有，於他性所成立之法也同樣，生義怎麼會成為實有呢？

5. 初中後三位，生前定不成，二二既為無，一一如何有。
[索]有為法的初生、中住、後滅三位，於生起前決定不會成立；（若許生住滅各住其位，則一一位中無有其餘二二位，）而住滅等二二既然無有，生等一一如何有？

6. 非離於他性，唯從自性生，非從他及俱，故生定非有。
[索]有為法非是離於其他法的體性而唯從自體性生起，因此諸有為法從自性、他性、自他二俱之中，其生決定非有。
(非離於他性，唯從自性生，故從自他俱，其生定非有。)

7. 前後及同時，二俱不可說，故生與瓶等，唯假有非真。
[索]生等諸相在瓶之前後及同時，二者均不可說，因此生與瓶，二者同時生起等非有存在。
(前後及同時，二俱不可說，是故生與瓶，同時生非有。)

問曰：瓶子的生是實有，否則無有生則不會有瓶子的舊，而人們現見瓶子有破碎相的舊存在，所以生也實有存在。
8. 舊若在新前，前生不應理，舊若居新後，後生理不成。
[索]如果說以前生起的瓶子有故舊存在，而瓶子在以前初生之時並不自性成立為舊；如果說是後來生起的舊，而後生亦不能成立舊實有自性。
(若前生故者，前生不成舊，若謂後生者，後生亦不成。)

9. 現非因現起，亦非因去來，未來亦不因，去來今世起。
[索]猶如現在諸法，不是從現世生起，也不是從未來生，也不是從過去生起的。
(如現在諸法，不從現世起，非從未來生，亦非從過去。)

10. 若具即無來，既滅應非往，法體相如是，幻等喻非虛。
[索]諸法的生既然無所從來，其滅也就無有所往之處，一切法皆是這樣，因此三有怎麼不是如幻無自性呢？
(生既無所來，滅亦無所往，如是則三有，如何非如幻。)

11. 生住滅三相，同時有不成，前後亦為無，如何執為有。
[索]生住滅三相同時存在不能成立，前後次第存在也是不成立，那麼如何才能有自性的生呢？
(生住滅三相，同時有不成，前後亦為無，如何當有生。)

12. 若生等諸相，復有別生等，應住滅如生，或生住如滅。
[索]若生等諸相，各復有生等一切相，以此應許滅也如生，住相也應如滅，生住滅相輾轉應成無窮。
(若生等諸相，復有一切相，故滅應如生，住亦應如滅。)

問曰：能相所相是一體或異體都可以成立，如所相是瓶子，異於其能相生住滅，二者是異體。
13. 所相異能相，何為體非常，不異四應同，或復全非有。
[索]若所相異於能相，為何所相法本體不是常法呢？或相反所相與能相一體，以此所相與生住滅四法，都應無有成實自體。
(所相異能相，何為體非常，或者彼四法，皆無有自體。)

問曰：生等諸法應該有自性，因為諸法有能生的作用故。
14. 有不生有法，有不生無法，無不生有法，無不生無法。
[索]有體的法不生於有體法，有體法也不生於無體法；無體法不生於有體法，無體法也不生於無體法。

15. 有不成有法，有不成無法，無不成有法，無不成無法。
[索]有體的生不能成立於有法上，有體的生也不能成立於無法之中；無體的生不能成立於有法上，無體的生也不成立於無法中。

問曰：雖然已生、未生都無生，但是正生時應當有自性的生。
16. 半生半未生，非一生時體，或以未生位，應亦是生時。
[索]諸法正生時可以說半生半未生，以此正生時不能成立自性的生；否則應成一切時，都可成為正生時。
(生時謂半生，故生時不生，或則應一切，皆我為生時。)

17. 生時若是果，體即非生時，生時若自然，應失生時性。
[索]生時若要造作生時的本體，則不能成立生時；若不造作生時的本體，亦不能成立為正生時。
(作為生時體，則不成生時，不作生時體，亦不成生時。)

問曰：正生時有自性，因為它住在過去與未來之間，觀待它在中間的分界，才可安立過去與未來。
18. 已生異未生，別有中間位，生時異二位，應別有中間。
[索]若許過去未來二時中間，無有不存在中間時的情況即有中間時的成立，則中間正生時應無有自性，因為彼正生時也有中間的原故。
(若二時中間，無無中間者，則無有生時，彼有中間故。)

19. 若謂生時捨，方得已生時，是則應有餘，得時而可見。
[索]由於生時在種因滅壞後，才有生時生的存在，以此應該可以見到，有其餘的生時本體存在。
(由於生時滅，乃有生時生，是故應可見，有餘生時體。)

20. 若至已生位，理必無生時，已生有生時，云何從彼起。
[索]若某法至已生位時，依理必然無有正生時的存在；若法已生位有生時，則正生怎麼會從其中現起呢？

問曰：正生時是該法未生，而正在趣向生，以此名為生。
21. 未至已生位，若立為生時，何不謂無瓶，未生無別故。
[索]尚未至已生的分位，若強立為生時，那麼為何不說正作瓶時為無瓶呢？因為已生與未生無有差別故。

22. 非生時有用，能簡未生時，亦非體未圓，別於已生位。
[索]若許正生時生體尚未圓滿而有生的作用，以此不同於未生的分位，這樣也成正生時異於已生位，以此理應成立未生為生。
(生時體未圓，異於未生位，是亦異已生，故應未生生。)

23. 前位生時無，後位方言有，兼成已生位，故此位非無。
[索]如果說正生時，是先無生體而後才有生體，此也是許未生生的觀點，而未生又怎麼能生呢？
(若說言生時，先無後乃有，此亦未生生，未生何能生。)

24. 有時名已生，無時名未起，除茲有無位，誰復謂生時。
[索]生體圓具時說名為有體，未作成生體時說名為無體，若尚無生體，那麼能說何者為生時呢？
(體圓說名有，未作說為無，若尚無生時，說何為生時。)

25. 諸有執離因，無別所成果，轉生及轉滅，理皆不可成。
[索]以正理觀察，諸法正在顯現時，若離其因，則不會別有所成的果，所以爾時果生與因滅，依理皆不可成立有自性。
(若時離其因，無別所成果。爾時生與滅，理皆不可成。)

CHAPTER 15
351. If what does not exist at the last is produced
How can the non-existent be produced?
If what exists from the outset is produced
How can that which exists be produced?
352. Since the effect destroys the cause,
That which does not exist will not be produced.
Nor will that which exists be produced
Since what is established needs no establisher.
353. There is no production at that time,
Nor is there production at another.
If not produced at that time nor another,
When will there ever be production?
354. Just as there is no production
Of that as the thing it is,
Neither is it produced
As something else.
355. The first, intermediate and last
Are not possible prior to production.
How can each begin
Without the other two?
356. The thing itself does not occur
Without other things.
Thus there is no coming into existence
Either from self or from other.
357. It cannot be said to exist
Before, after or simultaneously;
Therefore production does not occur
Simultaneously with the pot.
358. That which was previously produced
Was not old when first produced.
Also that which afterwards has been
Constantly produced is not old.
359. A present thing does not
Come into existence from itself,
Nor come into existence from the future,
And also not from the past.

360. There is no coming of the produced,
Likewise no going of that which has ceased.
Since it is thus, why should existence
Not be like a magician's illusions?
361. Production, duration and disintegration
Do not occur simultaneously.
If they are not consecutive either,
When can they ever occur?
362. If for production and all the others,
All of these occurred again,
Disintegration would seem like production
And duration like disintegration.
363. If that which is characterized is said to be
Different from its characteristics,
How can the characterized be impermanent?
Alternatively, existence of all four is unclear.
364. A thing is not produced from a thing
Nor is a thing produced from a non-thing.
A non-thing is not produced from a non-thing
Nor is a thing produced from a non-thing.
365. A thing does not become a thing,
Nor does a non-thing become a thing.
A non-thing does not become a non-thing,
Nor does a thing become a non-thing.
366. A thing in the process of production
Since half-produced, is not being produced.
Alternatively it follows that everything
Is in the process of being produced.
367. That which has the nature of presently being produced
Is not in the process of production,
Nor is that in the process of production
Which lacks the nature of presently being produced.
368. For anyone to whom the two are
Impossible without an intermediate,
There is nothing in the process of production,
For it too would have an intermediate.
369. Since the process of production is the arising
Of the produced through cessation,
That which is presently being produced
Appears to be a different entity.

370. When a thing is produced there cannot be
Anything in the process of production.
If the produced is in the process
Of production, why is it being produced?
371. A thing in the process of production is said
To be the entirely unproduced arising.
Since there is no difference, why should the pot
Not be considered as non-existent?
372. That which is presently being produced,
Though incomplete, is other than unproduced.
Yet also since other than produced,
The unproduced is being produced.
373. That which is presently being produced,
Though not yet existent, is later said to exist.
The unproduced is thus being produced --
But the non-existent does not arise.
374. The completed is called existent.
The uncompleted is called non-existent.
When there is nothing in the process of production
What is being referred to as such?
375. Since without a cause
There is no effect,
Both starting and stopping
Are not feasible.

中觀四百論-第十四 破邊執品

 第十四 破邊執品
問曰：如果說所有緣起現像如同旋火輪，無有自性，那麼什麼叫做有自性呢？
1. 諸法若實有，應不依他成，既必依他成，定知非實有。
[索]若有任何法都不依靠他法，而是自己能單獨成立存在，這種法即可說為實有，然而這種法於任何處任何時都不會有。
(若有任何法，都不依他成，可說為實有，然彼皆非有。)

2. 非即色有瓶，非離色有瓶，非依瓶有色，非有瓶依色。
[索]瓶與色非一體，否則色即是瓶，也非異於瓶體有色相；非依於瓶子有色相，非有瓶子依於色相。
(非一色即瓶，非異瓶具色，非依瓶有色，非有瓶依色。)

3. 若見二相異，謂離瓶有同，二相既有殊，應離瓶有異。
[索]如果見有性與瓶，總別二相是異，便說離瓶子實體有同（有性），但按理非是這樣，若是這樣，同（有性）為何不異於瓶呢？
(若見二相異，謂離瓶有同，非爾是則同，何不異於瓶。)

問曰：瓶有實體，因為有一、二等德數異體所依故。
4. 若一不名瓶，瓶應不名一，瓶一曾無合，瓶應無一名。
[索]如果一等德數不叫做瓶，那麼瓶也不應叫做一；此瓶與所具德數並非相等，由此瓶亦不是一。
(若一不名瓶，瓶應不名一，此具非相等，由此亦非一。)

5. 若色遍於實，色實得大名，敵論若非他，應申自宗義。
[索]如果色能遍於實質，色實際上得到了「大德」的名稱；敵方觀點若非他宗而是自宗，即應申自宗教義駁斥敵論，（然汝怎麼能以自宗來難內道呢？

問曰：他性異體的功德雖已破除，但所相──瓶子尚未破除，因此瓶有自性。
6. 有數等能相，顯所相不成，除此更無因，故諸法非有。
[索]非是由於能相而能成立其所相實有，所以此中離於一、二德數等，實有自性的瓶體亦應非有。
(非由於能相，能成其所相，此中異數等，實性亦非有。)

7. 離別相無瓶，故瓶體非一，一一非瓶故，瓶體亦非多。
[索]離開色等八微別相外無有瓶，所以瓶體不是自性獨立一體；而八微的一一體都不是瓶體，所以瓶體也不是多體。

問曰：由八微互相接觸和合即可成為一瓶，所以瓶子是實有。
8. 非無有觸體，與有觸體合，故色等諸法，不可合為瓶。
[索]瓶非是由無有觸體的色香味觸，與有觸體的地水火風和合成一體，所以色等八微諸法，不可能和合成為實有的瓶。

問曰：觸與非觸雖然互不相觸，但是有觸與非觸的和合，故瓶是實有。
9. 色是瓶一分，故色體非瓶，有分既為無，一分如何有。
[索]色只是瓶的一分，所以色體非是瓶；有分（瓶）既然無實體存在，那麼一一支分怎麼會有自性存在呢？

10. 一切色等性，色等相無差，唯一類是瓶，餘非有何理。
[索]在一切瓶等粗大色法的體性上，色等八微的性相無有差別，而只有一類是瓶，其餘的不是，這有什麼道理依據呢？
 11. 若色異味等，不異於瓶等，瓶等即味等，色何即瓶等。
[索]若許色異於香味等，而不異於瓶等本體，但是無有異於色的香味等法，瓶的自體即成無有，因此瓶怎麼不異於色呢？
(若色異味等，不異於瓶等，無彼等自無，如何不異色。)

12. 瓶等既無因，體應不成果，故若異色等，瓶等定為無。
[索]瓶等諸法既然無自性生因，其體不應成為有自性的果，所以若異於色等支分，瓶等決定無有自性。

問曰：瓶是觀待自己的泥團等支分而生起的果，因此瓶子的自因存在，瓶體實有自性。
13. 瓶等因若有，可為瓶等因，瓶等因既無，如何生瓶等。
[索]如果說瓶子是由自因泥團而生起，而泥團復從其他因緣而成，如此因法自體尚不能成立，那如何能生起實有的他體果呢？
(若瓶由因生，因復從他成，自體尚不成，如何能生他。)

問曰：瓶雖然是眾多支分合成的，但是支分能合為一體，所以瓶有自性。
14. 色等和合時，終不成香等，故和合一體，應如瓶等無。
[索]色香等支分和合時，色始終不會成為香等其他支分，所以色香等和合而成為一體，應如同瓶的實體一樣無有存在。

15. 如離於色等，瓶體實為無，色體亦應然，離風等非有。
[索]如同離色香等微塵的聚合外，瓶體實為無有；而色體也應同樣，離風等大種外無有存在。

問曰：離開大種則無有色體等，然而大種不觀待任何他法，所以應許大種實有。
16. 暖即是火性，非暖如何燒，故薪體為無，離此火非有。
[索]暖就是火的本性，如果薪柴燃料不是暖熱，又怎麼燒呢？所以不觀待火則薪體無有，離此薪體，火亦非有存在。

問曰：薪是堅等體性，而非暖性，但由火的燃燒使它成為暖，所以薪是所燒，火是能燒。
17. 餘煖雜故成，如何不成火，若餘不成煖，由火法應無。
[索]其餘薪由於可以與火交雜成為暖熱，為什麼它不能成為能燒的火呢？如果其餘薪不能雜火成為暖熱，則不可說彼上有火存在。
(餘煖雜成故，如何不成火，若餘不成煖，不可說彼有。)

問曰：由於火極微中無有其餘的三大種，所以雖然無有所燒薪，能燒火也可以實有存在。
18. 若火微無薪，應離薪有火，火微有薪者，應無火極微。
[索]若火的極微中無有薪，應成離薪無因有火；若火的極微中有薪，則應無有單獨一體的極微。
(若火微無薪，應離薪有火，火微有薪者，則無一極微。)

19. 審觀諸法時，無一體實有，無體既非有，多體亦應無。
[索]仔細觀察諸法時，任何法無實有一體存在，既然不存實有的一體，實有的多體亦應無有。

20. 若法更無餘，汝謂為一體，諸法皆三性，故一體為無。
[索]若認為任何法離地等極微更無其餘法，汝等（勝論師）便說地極微等為一體常法，而汝宗又許諸法中皆有三性，以此實有的一體不能成立。 

21. 有非有俱非，一非一雙泯，隨次應配屬，智者達非真。
[索]對有、非有、亦有亦非有（雙俱）、非有非非有（雙非）的邊執，以一非一雙皆泯滅之正理，隨此四邊之次第應當配屬，即分別予以遮破，智者以此即能了達四邊皆非真實。

問曰：如果說一切法全然無有自性，即不會使敵論者得到滿意，因為敵論者認為一切法都成實常有，那麼是什麼原因使他們生起如是執著呢？
22. 於相續假法，惡見謂真常，積集假法中，邪執言實有。
[索]對相續假立諸法，愚夫以惡見故說為真常；在積集假法中，愚夫以邪執故說為實有。

問曰：若認為我們見諸法是邪見，而不許諸法實有，則應成諸法都不能見，都成為無有，這是不合理的。
23. 諸法眾緣成，性羸無自在，虛假依他立，故我法皆無。
[索]無論何法若是從眾因緣而生成，彼即無有自在（即不能無礙地自性存在），因此等諸法本來皆無自在，所以人我法我皆非實有。
(若有從緣成，彼即無自在，此皆無自在，是故我非有。)

24. 果眾緣合成，離緣無別果，如是合與果，諸聖達皆無。
[索]諸法若無有自性果體，那麼就都無有真實的因緣和合；若為了取果而和合因緣，則聖者以根本智可現見彼等無有和合。
(諸法若無果，皆無有和合，為果而和合，聖見彼無合。)

25. 識為諸有種，境是識所行，見境無我時，諸有種皆滅。
[索]心識是諸三有的種子，而色聲等境是識的所行之處；如果已見色等諸境無我（自性）時，諸有種子皆會息滅。

CHAPTER 14
326. If a thing did not depend
On anything else at all
It would be self-established,
But such a thing exists nowhere.
327. "The form is a pot" -- they are not one.
The pot that has form is not separate.
The pot does not have form,
Nor does the form have a pot.
328. Since the two are seen to have dissimilar
Characteristics, if the pot is separate
From existence, why would existence
Not also be separate from the pot?
329. If one is not accepted as the pot
The pot also is not one.
Moreover possession is not reciprocal,
Therefore also it is not one.
330. If the form is the size of the substance,
Why is the form not large?
If the opponent were not different
Scriptural sources could be cited.
331. By virtue of its characteristic
The characterized does not exist.
Such a thing has no existence
As something different from number and so forth.
332. Because the pot is not separate
From its characteristics, it is not one.
If there is not a pot for each,
Plurality is not feasible.
333. The tangible and the intangible
Cannot be said to coalesce.
Thus it is in no way feasible
For these forms to coalesce.
334. Form is a component of the pot
And thus, for a start, is not the pot.
Since the compound does not exist,
Neither do the components.335. If the definition of form
Applies without incongruity
To all forms, for what reason
Is one a pot and not all others?
336. If you assert form is distinct from
Taste and so forth but not from the pot,
How can that which does not exist
Without these not be distinct from form?
337. The pot has no causes
And is itself not an effect.
Thus there is no pot at all
Apart from form and so forth.
338. If the pot exists by virtue of its causes
And those causes by virtue of others,
How can that which does not exist
By virtue of itself produce something disparate?
339. Though they meet and come together
Form cannot be smell.
Therefore like the pot
The composite cannot be one.
340. Just as the pot does not exist
Apart from form and so forth,
Likewise form does not exist
Apart from air and so forth.
341. That which is hot is fire but how
Can that burn which is not hot?
Thus so-called fuel does not exist
And without it fire too does not.
342. Even if it is hot only when
Overpowered, why is it not fire?
Yet if not hot, to say fire contains
Something else is not plausible.
343. If the particle has no fuel
Fire without fuel exists.
If even it has fuel, a single-natured
Particle does not exist.

344. When different things are examined
None of them have singleness.
Because there is no singleness
There is no plurality either.
345. Though they assert that where there are none
Of those things there is singleness,
Singleness does not exist
Since everything is threefold.
346. The approach of existence, non-existence,
Both existence and non-existence, and neither,
Should always be applied by those
With mastery to oneness and so forth.
347. When the continuum is misapprehended,
Things are said to be permanent.
Similarly when composites are
Misapprehended, things are said to exist.
348. Anything that has dependent arising
Is not independent.
All these are not independent,
Therefore there is no self.
349. Things do not assemble
Unless there is an effect.
Aggregation for an effect
Is not included for the Exalted.
350. The awareness that is the seed of existence
Has objects as its sphere of activity.
When selflessness is seen in objects,
The seed of existence is destroyed.

中觀四百論-第十三破根境品

第十三 破根境品
問曰：佛教法中說諸法皆無自性，對此我等不能接受，因為諸法若無自性，應該如兔角一樣不能現見，而實際中色瓶等事完全可以現見，所以一切法應該要有自性。
1. 於瓶諸分中，可見唯是色，言瓶全可見，如何能悟真。
[索]若由眼識見瓶色的時候，非能見到瓶的一切支分，所以已見真性者誰會說，瓶是可以現見的有自相之法呢？
(若見瓶色時，非能見一切，見真者誰說，瓶為可現見。)

2. 諸有勝慧人，隨前所說義，於香味及觸，一切類應遮。
[索]諸有殊勝智慧的人，隨前頌所說的正義，對那些許香味及觸可由根識取到，而成立諸法有自性的這一切同類邪見均可遮除。

問曰：瓶與其色非是異體，而是一體法，所以由於見色，也就是見瓶的一切部分。
3. 若唯見瓶色，即言見瓶者，既不見香等，應名不見瓶。
[索]如果由眼識見到瓶色之故，便說見到了瓶的一切部分，那麼由於不見其餘香等部分故，瓶色也應該名為不見。
(若由見色故，便言見一切，由不見餘故，色應名不見。)

問曰：瓶子的整體雖然不是眼識的現量境，但是瓶色是現量境，依此類推即可現量成立瓶有自性。
4. 有障礙諸色，體非全可見，彼分及中間，由此分所隔。
[索]只就瓶色而言，亦不可有現見性，因為瓶色有彼分、此分和中分，即瓶色是依眾多支分假合而成故。
(即唯於瓶色，亦非現見性，以彼有彼分，此分中分故。)

5. 極微分有無，應審諦思察，引不成為證，義終不可成。
[索]極微的方分是有抑或無，應該詳細思考觀察，所以引用的極微不能成為瓶有自性的證據，所立的瓶是現量境之自性義始終不可能成立。 

6. 一切有礙法，皆眾分所成，言說字亦然，故非根所取。
[索]一切色法在觀察之下，都觀待其有分（整體）而成為支分色（支分），此支分色觀待其更細的支分又成為有分，所以諸法唯是依言說文字安立的假名，此言說文字中也無有任何實體可得。
(一切成分色，復成為有分，故言說文字，此中亦非有。)

問曰：由顯色形色所組成的瓶子，是眼識現量所見，所以瓶子應該是有自相之法。
7. 離顯色有形，云何取形色，即顯取顯色，何故不由身。
[索]如果離開顯色另有形色，那麼眼識為什麼能取形色呢？如果形色即是顯色，那麼取顯色何故不是由身識呢？

8. 離色有色因，應非眼所見，二法體既異，如何不別觀。
[索]若離開色法以外，則不能見到地等四大種色因，若這樣的果色與因色二體都實有存在，以什麼原因眼識不能現見二者呢？
(如離於色外，不見於色因，若如是二體，何故眼不取。)

9. 身覺於堅等，共立地等名，故唯於觸中，說地等差別。
[索]現見地大名為堅性，是身根所取境；因此只有在觸覺範圍中，才可以說名為地。
(見地名為堅，是身根所取，以是唯觸中，乃可說名地。)

10. 瓶所見生時，不見有異德，體生如所見，故實性都無。
[索]由所見所產生的緣故，這種瓶子無有少分功德，所以就像所見瓶從所見生而非真瓶一樣，其瓶的實有自性不能成立。
(由所見生故，此瓶無少德，故如所見生，其有性非有。)

問曰：現見色等境有自性，因為有能緣色等境的眼等諸根。
11. 眼等皆大造，何眼見非餘，故業果難思，牟尼真實說。
[索]眼等諸根都是大種所造，然而任何色處只有眼見而非其餘耳根等所能見，所以業果難可思議，這是釋迦牟尼佛的真實語。

問曰：眼根有自性，因為眼根的果識能見度。
12. 智緣未有故，智非在見先，居後智唐捐，同時見無用。
[索]眼識的緣尚未有故，眼識非在見境之先，若在見境之後眼識應成無義唐捐，眼識若與見境同時，則見的作用應成無用。

13. 眼若行至境，色遠見應遲，何不亦分明，照極遠近色。
[索]在見色時，眼根若要行至色境，那麼見遠處的色境時應當遲緩；而且，眼根為何不能同樣分明地照見極遠與極近的色境呢？

14. 若見已方行，行即為無用，若不見而往，定欲見應無。
[索]若是見色以後眼方行至色境，其行則無有任何功德；或者說先未見而行至所欲見的境後，言說決定能見度則應成虛妄。
(若見色眼行，其行則無德，或名所欲見，言定則成妄。)

問曰：眼見色是眼的自性功能，無需行至境，故無有上述過失。
15. 若不往而觀，應見一切色，眼既無行動，無遠亦無障。
[索]若許眼不往境而能自性地觀見，應成眼能無礙見一切色境；眼既然無需行至境即能見度，則無有遠近也無有障礙不障礙的差別。

16. 諸法體相用，前後定應同，如何此眼根，不見於眼性。
[索]眼若自性能見，即本性應成能見度一切法，如是先應自己能見自己，那為什麼此眼根不見它自己呢？
(一切法本性，先應自能見，何故此眼根，不見於眼性。)

問曰：眼雖然不能單獨見色，然而由眼、境、作意三緣和合，即能真實不虛地見到外境。
17. 眼中無色識，識中無色眼，色內二俱無，何能合見色。
[索]眼根中無有了別色境的作意，作意也無有見色的功能，而色境中，眼根與作意二者都不存在，那麼彼三緣和合怎麼能見色境呢？
(眼中無有識，識中亦無見，色中二俱無，彼何能見色。)

18. 所聞若能表，何不成非音，聲若非能詮，何故緣生解。
[索]如果聲音是說而行至耳根，聲音以何緣不成為說者呢？如果聲音不說而行到耳根，識以何緣對彼聲音生起了解呢？
(若聲說而行，何不成說者，若不說而行，何緣生彼解。)

19. 聲若至耳聞，如何了聲本，聲無頓說理，如何全可知。
[索]若聲行至耳根，耳識才能取聲音，那麼聲最初是由何者緣取？而且聲非能單獨行至耳根，耳識又怎麼能單獨取聲呢？
(若至耳取聲，聲初由何取，聲非單獨至，如何能單取。)

問曰：如果在最初生起時，聲音無有緣取者，這又有什麼過失呢？
20. 乃至非所聞，應非是聲性，先無而後有，理定不相應。
[索]聲音甚至未被聞到之前，應該不是聲音之性；而最初如果不是聲，聞到後變成聲，此決定不應理。
(聲乃至未聞，應非是聲性；無聲後成聲，此定不應理。)

問曰：心意能至境而取，所以意識取境是自性有。
21. 心若離諸根，去亦應無用，設如是命者，應常無有心。
[索]心意若離開諸根，去至境也應有取境作用；假設這樣，命者－我應恆常無有心。

問曰：諸根境若無有自性，那觀察不同境的想蘊又會如何呢？
22. 令心妄取塵，依先見如焰，妄立諸法義，是想蘊應知。
[索]使心識妄取色等塵境，依於先前所見境，使意識取執種種如同陽焰的幻相為實有，由是妄立諸法不同義相的心所法，應知這就是想蘊。

問曰：想蘊若無有自性，則一切法都不能建立。
23. 眼色等為緣，如幻生諸識，若執為實有，幻喻不應成。
[索]以眼根色境等為緣，就能如幻術般生起各種心識，如果執識等諸法為實有自性，則說如幻的比喻不應成立。

問曰：既說諸根非能取境，又說依眼色等為緣能生眼識，這豈不是稀有難測之事嗎？
24. 世間諸所有，無不皆難測，根境理同然，智者何驚異。
[索]世間所有的法，無不都是顯而無自性的稀有之事，根境無自性之理也是同樣，以此智者又有何驚異呢？

25. 諸法如火輪，變化夢幻事；水月彗星響，陽焰及浮雲。
[索]緣起諸法猶如火輪、變化、夢、幻事、水月、彗星、空谷迴聲、陽焰及浮雲，雖有顯現而無實體。

CHAPTER 13
301. When seeing its form the whole pot
Is not in fact seen. Who that knows
Reality would claim that the pot
Is directly perceptible also?
302. By means of this very analysis
Those with superior intelligence
Should refute individually
All that is fragrant, sweet and soft.
303. If because the form is seen
Everything is seen,
Why because of what is not seen
Would the form not be unseen?
304. There is no direct perception
Of just the form alone,
Because it has a close and distant
As well as a central part.
305. This also applies when one examines
Whether particles have parts or not.
Thus to prove a thesis by that
Which must be proved is not feasible.
306. Everything too is a component
As well as being a composite;
Thus even a spoken syllable
Does not have existence here.
307. If shape is distinct from colour
How is shape apprehended?
If not distinct, why would the body
Not also apprehend colour?
308. Only the form is visible
But the form's causes are not seen.
If indeed it is thus, why are both
Not also perceived by just the eyes.
309. Earth is seen as firm and stable
And is apprehended by the body.
Only that which is tangible
Is referred to as earth.

310. Since it was produced as something visible,
It is of no use at all to the pot.
As with the production of visibility,
It lacks even the entity of existence.
311. The eye, like the ear, is an outcome of
The elements. The eye sees while the others do not.
Certainly therefore the Subduer said
The fruition of actions is inconceivable.
312. Because the conditions are incomplete
There is no awareness before looking,
While afterwards awareness is of no use;
The instrument is of no use in the third case.
313. If the eye travels, that which is
Distant would take long to see.
Why are extremely close
And very distant forms not clear?
314. If the eye travels when the form is seen
Its movement is of no benefit.
Alternatively it is false to say
What it intends to view is ascertained.
315. If the eye perceives without travelling
It would see all these phenomena.
For that which does not travel there is
Neither distance nor obscuration.
316. If the nature of all things
First appears in themselves,
Why would the eye not
Be perceived by the eye itself?
317. The eye does not have consciousness
And consciousness lacks that which looks.
If form has neither of these,
How can they see form?
318. If sound makes a noise as it travels
Why should it not be a speaker?
Yet if it travels noiselessly, how could
Awareness arise in relation to it?
319. If sound is apprehended through contact,
What apprehends the beginning of sound?
If sound does not come alone,
How can it be apprehended in isolation?

320. While sound is not heard, it is not sound.
It is impossible
For that which is not sound
Finally to turn into sound.
321. Without the sense organs what will mind
Do after it has gone?
If it were so, why would that which lives
Not always be without mind?
322. An object already seen
Is perceived by mind like a mirage.
That which posits all phenomena
Is called the aggregate of recognition.
323. In dependence upon the eye and form
Mind arises like an illusion.
It is not reasonable to call
Illusory that which has existence.
324. When there is nothing on earth
That does not amaze the wise,
Why think cognition by the senses
And suchlike are amazing.
325. The firebrand's ring and magical creations,
Dreams, illusions, and the moon in water,
Mists, echoes, mirages, clouds
And worldly existence are alike.